Hospital Treatment Rates and Spill-over Effects: Does Ownership Matter? by Baltagi, Badi H. & Yen, Yin -Fang
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Center for Policy Research Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
Spring 1-2014 
Hospital Treatment Rates and Spill-over Effects: Does Ownership 
Matter? 
Badi H. Baltagi 
Syracuse University, bbaltagi@maxwell.syr.edu 
Yin -Fang Yen 
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, yyf@swufe.edu.cn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/cpr 
 Part of the Health Economics Commons, Medicine and Health Sciences Commons, and the Public 
Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Baltagi, Badi H. and Yen, Yin -Fang, "Hospital Treatment Rates and Spill-over Effects: Does Ownership 
Matter?" (2014). Center for Policy Research. 197. 
https://surface.syr.edu/cpr/197 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for Policy Research by an authorized administrator 
of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
Badi H. Baltagi and Yin-Fang Yen  
Hospital Treatment Rates and Spill-
over Effects: Does Ownership Matter? 
 
Paper No. 165 
January 2014 
CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH –Spring 2014 
Leonard M. Lopoo, Director 
Associate Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs (PAIA) 
__________ 
Associate Directors 
Margaret Austin 
Associate Director 
Budget and Administration 
John Yinger 
Trustee Professor of Economics and PAIA 
Associate Director, Metropolitan Studies Program 
SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 
 
Badi H. Baltagi ............................................ Economics 
Robert Bifulco ....................................................... PAIA 
Leonard Burman  .................................................. PAIA 
Thomas Dennison  ............................................... PAIA 
Alfonso Flores-Lagunes ............................. Economics 
Sarah Hamersma ................................................. PAIA 
William C. Horrace ..................................... Economics 
Yilin Hou .............................................................. PAIA 
Hugo Jales.................................................. Economics  
Duke Kao .................................................... Economics 
Jeffrey Kubik ............................................... Economics 
Yoonseok Lee ............................................ Economics 
Amy Lutz ....................................................... Sociology 
 
 
Yingyi Ma ...................................................... Sociology 
Jerry Miner .................................................. Economics 
Cynthia Morrow  ................................................... PAIA 
Jan Ondrich ................................................. Economics 
John Palmer ......................................................... PAIA 
David Popp .......................................................... PAIA 
Stuart Rosenthal ......................................... Economics 
Rebecca Schewe .......................................... Sociology 
Amy Ellen Schwartz  ......................... PAIA/Economics 
Perry Singleton…………………………........Economics 
Michael Wasylenko ... ……………………….Economics 
Peter Wilcoxen .................................................. …PAIA 
 
 
GRADUATE ASSOCIATES 
Dana Balter............................................................ PAIA 
Joseph Boskovski .................................................. PAIA  
Christian Buerger .................................................. PAIA  
Brianna Cameron .................................... Lerner Center 
Emily Cardon ......................................................... PAIA  
Sarah Conrad .......................................... Lerner Center 
Carlos Diaz ................................................... Economics 
Pallab Ghosh ................................................ Economics 
Lincoln Groves  ..................................................... PAIA 
Chun-Chieh Hu ............................................. Economics 
Jung Eun Kim ........................................................ PAIA 
Yan Liu ........................................................... Sociology 
Michelle Lofton ...................................................... PAIA 
Roberto Martinez ..................................... Lerner Center 
 
Qing Miao .............................................................. PAIA  
Nuno Abreu Faro E Mota ............................. Economics 
Judson Murchie  .................................................... PAIA 
Sun Jung Oh .......................................... Social Science 
Katie Oja .................................................. Lerner Center 
Laura Rodriquez-Ortiz  .......................................... PAIA 
Jordan Stanley ............................................. Economics  
Kelly Stevens ......................................................... PAIA 
Tian Tang  .............................................................. PAIA 
Liu Tian  ....................................................... Economics 
Rebecca Wang .............................................. Sociology 
Ian Wright .................................................... Economics 
Pengju Zhang ..................................................... PAIA 
 
 
STAFF
 
Kelly Bogart......….………...….Administrative Specialist 
Karen Cimilluca.....….….………..…..Office Coordinator 
Kathleen Nasto........................Administrative Assistant 
 
 
 
 
 
Candi Patterson.….………..….…Computer Consultant 
Mary Santy..….…….….……....Administrative Assistant 
Katrina Wingle.......….……..….Administrative Assistant 
Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of hospital ownership on treatment rates allowing for spatial 
correlation among hospitals. Competition among hospitals and knowledge spillovers generate 
significant externalities which we try to capture using the spatial Durbin model. Using a panel of 
2342 hospitals in the 48 continental states observed over the period 2005 to 2008, we find 
significant spatial correlation of medical service treatment rates among hospitals. We also get 
mixed results on the effect of hospital ownership on treatment rates that depends upon the market 
structure where the hospital is located and which varies by treatment type.  
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1. Introduction  
The quality and cost effectiveness of the health care system in the U.S. are two of the major 
concerns of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  According to World Health Organization (WHO), 
the total health expenditure of the U.S. accounted for 17.9% of the national GDP in 2010, which 
was the highest in the world. Despite spending this high expenditure on health, the health 
outcomes were not significantly better than those of other countries. In this paper we focus on 
ownership of the hospitals and their treatment rates. We distinguish between three types of 
hospital ownership: For-profit, not-for-profit, and government owned hospitals. There is an 
extensive literature focusing on hospital ownership, see for example Sloan (2000), McClellan 
and Staiger (2000), Sloan et al. (2001), Kessler and McClellan (2002), Horwitz and Nichols 
(2009), Bayindir (2012), to mention a few. A brief review of the different ownership theories and 
the empirical evidence is given in section 2. The empirical studies have mixed results. Both not-
for-profit and government hospitals enjoy tax exemptions and financial advantages. They may 
have the luxury of using their profits to finance less profitable services. Sloan (2000) finds that 
not-for-profit hospitals provide better overall quality to the community. Bayindir (2012) suggests 
that not-for-profit hospitals are more likely to treat uninsured patients and patients with public 
health insurance than for-profits hospitals. Some studies indicate that for-profits are profit-
seeking and have more financial incentives to provide better treatment and attract patients, while 
other studies suggest that there is no difference in quality between not-for-profits and for-profits 
hospitals. On the demand side, Jung, Feldman, and Scanlon (2011) find that hospitals with better 
reputation and higher quality of health care tend to increase patients’ willingness to revisit. 
Moscone, Tosetti, and Vittadini (2012) suggest that information from neighbors along with 
patients’ previous experience and hospital characteristics play important roles in their choice of 
hospitals in Italy. Porell and Adams (1995) survey the literature and report that patients are more 
1 
 
likely to choose hospitals with better health outcomes. The health care market is based on the 
interactions between hospitals and patients. We explore how this market generates externalities 
among hospitals. In particular, we study how the treatment rates of one hospital may be affected 
by the treatment rates and competition from other neighboring hospitals. 
The competition level of the market may be affected by the distance between hospitals, the 
hospital’s reputation and the quality of hospitals1. Tay (2003) suggests that patients have a 
tradeoff between the quality of the hospital and the distance to other hospitals2. Hospitals 
improve their quality to attract patients from other neighborhoods3. Horwitz and Nichols (2009) 
find that not-for-profit hospitals are more likely to provide relatively profitable services in a 
market with a higher proportion of for-profit admissions. Government hospitals are the least 
likely to offer profitable services and the most likely to offer unprofitable services. 
  Knowledge spillovers may also contribute to externalities of health care.  “A large 
medical literature has documented the important role of social networks in physician adoption of 
new technologies, suggesting that knowledge externalities are the source of the productivity 
spillovers.” See Chandra and Staiger (2007, p.133). Physicians may learn from each other and 
possibly transfer to another hospital, especially when a new technology or equipment is 
introduced. Agglomeration economies also suggest firms (hospitals) have stronger technology 
spillovers or faster learning process of a new innovation in a high firm density area (Breschi and 
1 We do not argue that price of medical services is negligible, but most patients have insurance (Tay, 2003). 
Insurance companies cover a major part of medical expense. Moreover, patients who are aged 65 and above are 
most likely covered by Medicare. The out-of-pocket payments from patients are relatively low (Sloan, 2000).  Porell 
and Adams (1995) indicate that studies do not find significant price effects when they use gross charges as the price 
measure.  
2 While almost half of acute myocardial infarction (AMI, or heart attack) patients are admitted to the closest hospital 
from home, more than 50% of the patients are willing to travel four to five miles further on average for better quality 
health care. 
3 However, using mortality rates, other empirical studies show mixed results of the effects of the competition on 
quality (see Gaynor, 2006). 
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Lissoni, 2001; Cohen and Morrison Paul, 2008; Baicker and Chandra, 2010). Hence, it is 
important to take into account the possible spillovers from one hospital to its neighboring 
hospitals.  
         These spillovers create a spatial correlation of quality, which is presented in Figure 1. The 
maps present the geographic distribution of the summary Hospital Compare quality scores by 
hospital referral region4 (HRR) in the United States in 2005 (The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care). 
The scores indicate the average percentages of heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia clinical 
processes that are given to patients in the HRR. Figure 1a shows the spatial patterns of the 
overall score. The treatment rates are above 90% in many HRRs in the middle and north eastern 
United States. One may argue that these HRRs are wealthier urban areas. Therefore, their overall 
medical quality is higher than the national average. The geographic clusters suggest 
heterogeneity of health care across the country. However, we also find geographic clusters of 
high treatment rates in some less wealthy HRRs, such as those in North Carolina. This confirms 
the results by Skinner (2012) that demographic variables cannot fully explain the geographic 
variations in health care. The clusters may also indicate that the medical quality of one HRR is 
correlated with that of its neighboring HRRs. Focusing on the treatment rates by illness condition, 
we find the geographic patterns of heart attack and heart failure treatments in Figures 1b and 1c 
to be similar to that of the overall treatments. The geographic pattern of pneumonia treatments in 
Figure 1d is slightly different from heart disease treatments, but a spatial correlation persists.  
When examining the interaction among hospitals, most studies utilize the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) or similar market share variables as measures of competition level or 
market structure. While these indices are good measures of the aggregate competition level of 
4 Dartmouth Atlas defines the hospital referral regions by the regional market of health care. Patients are able to 
transfer or be referred to another hospital for major cardiovascular surgical procedures and for neurosurgery in the 
same HRR. One HRR can cross different counties and states.  
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the market, they do not take distances between hospitals into consideration. A market with three 
hospitals close to each other is considered to have the same competition as one with three 
hospitals spread out. 
In this paper, we utilize a spatial Durbin model of hospital treatment rates. This spatial 
model is able to identify the intensity of geographic correlations. Other studies using spatial 
analysis in health care include Mobley et al. (2006) who studied elderly access to primary care 
services. They use the spatial lag model, which includes the spatial lagged dependent variable to 
model spillovers. They find a strong and positive spatial correlation for hospital treatments. 
However, they do not consider hospital ownership as an aspect of quality disparity.  
In addition to spillover effects, the spatial Durbin model allows us to examine whether the 
market structure affects the treatment rates. The market of medical services is composed of 
hospitals with different characteristics, such as ownership and size. As suggested by Horwitz and 
Nichols (2009), hospitals have different treatment decisions based on the market structure they 
are facing. We cannot assume the spillover effects are the same for all types of markets. 
Operational strategies of hospitals may not only differ by the type of ownership but may also 
respond to the type of ownership of neighbors. 
We use clinical process treatment rates from Hospital Compare as our dependent variable. 
Compared to other measures, like the mortality rate or the length of hospital stays, the process 
treatment rates are less noisy and reflect real hospital medical services. Our study finds strong 
and positive spillover effects among hospitals for heart attack patients. The spillover effects are 
even stronger for less acute illness conditions like heart failure and pneumonia. We find some 
evidence that not-for-profit hospitals provide better medical services than government and for-
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profit hospitals, but the treatments also differ by the market structure. Hospitals in a market with 
stronger intensity of not-for-profit hospitals are more likely to provide medications at discharge 
but less likely to perform percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) in time. Moreover, the 
treatment rates of hospitals decrease if they are surrounded by large hospitals. The overall effect 
depends on the characteristics of the hospital, the spillover effects, and the market structure. 
2.  Literature Review 
Unlike most of the industries that are composed of for-profit firms, about 60% of the non-
federal hospitals in the United States were not-for-profit and only 20% were for-profit in 2010. 
As Horwitz and Nichols (2009, p.925) summarize in their Table 1, there are four theories of not-
for-profit hospitals: (1) maximizing own output (Newhouse, 1970): not-for-profits are profit-
seeking and maximize profitable services as for-profits do. They will offer more health care until 
profits are driven to zero; (2) maximizing the community output (Lee and Weisbrod, 1977): the 
goal of not-for-profits is to benefit the whole community and to maximize market output 
including unprofitable services; (3) for-profit in disguise (Pauly and Redisch, 1973): nonprofits 
would be essentially identical to for-profit hospitals in equilibrium, with economic profits 
counted as costs (salaries or perquisites accruing to staff physicians); and (4)  a mixture of (1) 
and (2) (Hirth, 1997): not-for-profits behave depending on the competition level of the market. 
They are profit-seeking when facing competition.  
The empirical studies have mixed results. Tax exemptions allow not-for-profit and 
government hospitals to provide better quality to the community or more medical care to 
uninsured patients (Sloan, 2000; Bayindir, 2012). Clement et al. (2002) note that for-profit 
hospitals provide less charity care than not-for-profits. McClellan and Staiger (2000) also 
suggest that not-for-profit hospitals treat elderly patients with heart disease slightly better than 
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for-profits hospitals. Sloan et al. (2001) find that for-profit hospitals are more likely to use high-
tech procedures with higher costs, while Kessler and McClellan (2002) find that areas with for-
profit hospitals have lower hospital expenditures, but virtually the same patient health outcomes. 
They conclude that for-profit hospitals have important spillover benefits for medical productivity. 
Geweke, Gowrisankaran, and Town (2003) use a Bayesian model to estimate hospital quality in 
Los Angeles County. Focusing on elderly pneumonia patients, they find that there is not a 
definitive difference in mortality rates by hospital ownership. This is in line with the results of 
Sloan et al. (2001) and Sloan and Taylor (1999). These studies find weak evidence that the 
mortality rate of Medicare patients and the probability of readmission differ by hospital 
ownership.  
However, when competition and market structure are taken into consideration, several 
studies suggest that the first or the last theory has more support. Horwitz and Nichols (2009) find 
not-for-profit hospitals are more likely to provide profitable services in a high for-profit market 
(15% of for-profit admissions or higher). The spillovers of medical services provided make not-
for-profit hospitals behave more like for-profits in a high for-profit market. The role of hospital 
ownership is less important when the competition level increases. Not-for-profits compete with 
for-profit hospitals by providing better quality of health care (Sloan, 2000). McClellan and 
Staiger (2000) also suggest that the growing difference in mortality rates of the elderly AMI 
patients between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals may be attributed to various factors, 
including location. Hospitals compete by providing better quality even though improving quality 
can be very costly (Morey et al., 1992). Fournier and Mitchell (1992) and Robinson and Luft 
(1985) suggest that increased competition is usually associated with increased cost. Propper, 
Burgess, and Green (2004) on the other hand argue that increased competition may lower 
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hospital quality5. The treatment decisions may depend on the competition level of the market the 
hospitals are located in.  
Besides competition, knowledge spillovers among physicians could also cause spatial 
correlations. Physicians are more likely to practice intensive treatments in a market with 
advanced medical technologies. Chandra and Staiger (2007) find that spillovers of technology 
increase the treatment rate in the market. Cardiac catheterization rate of AMI patients is higher in 
a market with a higher propensity for intensive treatments. Physicians learn practice skills from 
other physicians, and possibly transfer these skills to other hospitals due to job movement or due 
to these physicians working at multiple hospitals. About 40% of physicians with inpatient duty 
work at more than one hospital (Fisher et al., 2007). This mobility increases the probability of 
exchanging knowledge among physicians. Therefore, interactions and spatial correlations of 
treatments among hospitals should not be neglected when we examine hospital treatment rates. 
A similar perspective from urban economists is agglomeration. Firms (hospitals) may 
operate more efficiently with geographical concentration due to economies of scale or 
technology spillovers (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Cohen and Morrison Paul, 2008; Baicker and 
Chandra, 2010). The geographical clusters of firms may be due to “labor pooling”. Firms 
(hospitals) may lower costs due to a larger and better pool of labor (Cohen and Morrison Paul, 
2008). In addition, firms (hospitals) adopt new innovation more rapidly when this innovation has 
high financial incentives (Baicker and Chandra, 2010). Cohen and Morrison Paul (2008) use data 
on hospitals in Washington State and find that clustering reduces labor costs in several treatment 
centers. Baicker and Chandra (2010) examine the “high-value care” with Hospital Compare 
5 There are other studies that suggest competition improve cost-effectiveness and generate economy of scale 
(Dranove, Shanley, and Simon, 1992; Kessler and McClellan, 2000, Zwanziger and Melnick, 1988). Bloom et al. 
(2010) find that competition increases management quality of the public hospitals in the U.K. 
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treatment rates and “low-value care” with end-of-life spending of Medicare beneficiaries. Their 
results suggest that hospital quality is positively associated with neighbors’ quality even though 
they do not control for the distance between the hospitals and only measure the overall treatment 
score.  
Mobley et al. (2006) study this geographic correlation of health care in the U.S. They use 
Admissions for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs) among elderly patients in the 
late 1990s as the preventive care utilization measure. ACSCs are preventable admissions and 
therefore can be an indicator of poor quality. They use a spatial lag model with both maximum 
likelihood and two stage least squares methods. They find strong and positive spatial correlations. 
More ACSCs in neighboring hospitals are associated with an increase in ACSCs for the hospital 
itself. The utilization rates are not significantly different between the elderly living in poor rural 
areas and those living in urban areas.  
3.  Data and methodology 
We model hospital treatment rates using the spatial Durbin panel model given by 
y𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆Wy𝑡𝑡 + H𝑡𝑡γ1 + X𝑡𝑡β + WH𝑡𝑡γ2 + 𝜀𝜀s + τ𝑡𝑡 + u𝑡𝑡      t=1,2,..,T 
u𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = µ𝑖𝑖 + v𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡      i=1,2,..,N 
where y𝑡𝑡 is an (Nx1) vector of treatment rates for N hospitals at time t. W is an (NxN) spatial 
weight matrix, whose diagonal elements are zero and whose off diagonal elements are the 
normalized inverse distance from hospital i to hospital j. This weight matrix is row-normalized, 
i.e., the elements in each row sum to one, ∑ w𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1Nj=1 . Wy𝑡𝑡 is the spatial lagged dependent 
variable, which presents the weighted average treatment rates of neighboring hospitals. As we 
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mentioned earlier, the treatment rates of own hospital may be affected by the treatment rates of 
neighboring hospitals through competition or knowledge spillovers. λ thus measures the spillover 
effect of hospital treatment rates. H𝑡𝑡 is an (Nxk) matrix of hospital characteristics, and X𝑡𝑡 is an 
(Nxc) matrix of county demographic variables where hospital i is located. 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠 and τ𝑡𝑡 are state and 
year fixed effects. u𝑡𝑡 is an (Nx1) vector of error component disturbances. As the second equation 
shows, the typical element of  u𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the hospital random effect µ𝑖𝑖 and a remainder classical 
disturbance v𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. µ𝑖𝑖 is assumed to be i.i.d. (0, σµ2) and v𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is assumed to be i.i.d. (0, σv2). µi and v𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
are independent of each other and the regressors H𝑡𝑡  and X𝑡𝑡. 
 Our panel data consists of all hospitals in the 48 continental states that reported their 
treatment rates every year from 2005 to 2008. Neighboring hospitals are those within a 30 miles 
radius. Thirty miles may seem arbitrary, but Horwitz and Nichols (2007) indicate that 90% of the 
discharges are from a mean radius of 21.5 miles of non-rural hospitals, compared to 25.2 miles 
for rural hospitals. Therefore, 30 miles seems reasonable to cover the potential market. In order 
to measure the spillover effects, we only include hospitals with at least one neighbor within the 
30-mile radius. The maximum number of hospital neighbors is 109 and the average number of 
neighbors for each hospital is 20.56. 
Our dependent variables are the treatment rates from Hospital Compare of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services. This data set was released in 2004. The treatment rates are the 
percentages of the eligible adult patients who were actually given seven clinical processes of care 
for heart attack treatments6. Instead of examining the spillover effects on each of the seven AMI 
clinical processes separately, we combine them into four categories: (1) overall treatment rate; (2) 
giving aspirin and/or beta blockers at arrival; (3) prescribing aspirin/beta blockers/angiotensin 
6 Hospital Compare includes 17 clinic processes of care in total for heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. 
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converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors at discharge; and (4) giving percutaneous coronary 
intervention (PCI) within 120 minutes of arrival7. The first category refers to the average of all 
treatments offered to AMI patients. The medications are similar in the second and third 
categories, but the timing of prescriptions indicates different treatment purposes. The second 
category indicates timely treatments that can relieve the conditions. The third category implies 
preventive treatments to reduce the probability of readmissions. These three categories are 
obtained using a weighted average where the weights are the number of cases in each process. 
PCI is a coronary angioplasty. It is a relatively high intensity treatment, which requires skilled 
staff and equipment. 
A heart attack is a very acute condition, and patients need immediate medical care. They 
are most likely to be taken to hospitals in distinct local markets8. This precludes patients from 
travelling long distances to seek care and in turn being less likely to select the hospital they like. 
In addition, hospitals need to treat patients who check in to the emergency room, regardless of 
their insurance type. Focusing on heart attack processes allow us to reduce the selection issue 
between patients and hospitals. As Chandra and Staiger (2007, p.117) put it: “markets for heart 
attack treatment are geographically distinct…mobility is limited, and it is possible to observe 
production in many distinct local markets.” One may argue that the competition or spillover can 
be limited due to this reason. However, the interactions between hospitals should have an impact 
on overall quality or specialized fields, rather than only on specific treatments or illness 
condition. 
7 Smoking consultation is also included in the overall treatment receiving rate.  
8 Even if patients travel four to five miles for better treatments as suggested by Tay (2003), these hospitals may still 
be within one market according to our definition of neighborhood. 
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There are several advantages of using Hospital Compare as our quality measures. First, the 
processes reflect the real medical services that are delivered to patients in a timely manner. Even 
though using health outcomes, such as mortality rate, as quality measures can cover 
unobservable factors, they could be noisy due to relatively low mortality probability (McClellan 
and Staiger, 2000). The processes in Hospital Compare are timely and effective for patients. 
Many of the processes for AMI patients are recommended in the ACC/AHA Guidelines for the 
Management of Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction (1999). Second, most of these 
processes are not intensive or require advanced technologies. Hospitals should be able to provide 
the treatments regardless of the size and the specialization of the hospital. We acknowledge that 
these are the basic treatments, which can be achieved easily. One hospital with lower treatment 
rates may not guarantee a worse overall quality. It may focus on other medical and non-medical 
services that are not included in the data, such as open heart surgery. However, these non-
intensive treatments, such as giving beta blockers, serve as a marker of the quality of non-
intensive medical management in a hospital, see Chandra and Staiger (2007, p.118). Heidenreich 
and McClellan (2001) and Rogers et al. (2000) find that giving aspirin/beta blockers/ACE 
inhibitors is the major reason for increasing survival rate following AMI. Third, these measures 
only include patients who are appropriate for the treatments. One limitation of our data is that it 
is at the hospital level. Without patient-level data, we have no information about the 
characteristics and illness severity of patients.  
Data for the hospital characteristics are taken from the AHA Guide and Provider of 
Services File and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which includes: indicators of 
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not-for-profit hospitals, for-profit hospitals, teaching hospitals9, and locating in an MSA; number 
of beds; number of nurses per bed; HHI; and CMI. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the 
sum of squares of each hospital’s market share based on the number of beds within its 
neighborhood. HHI is an indicator of market concentration/competition. A larger index indicates 
a lower concentration of the health care market. The market may be dominated by one large 
hospital and few small hospitals. To overcome one of the shortages of the Hospital Compare data, 
we use Case Mix Index (CMI) to control for the average severity of the patients in the hospital. 
CMI indicates the average cost per patient. A larger CMI means more complicated 
processes/treatments are offered to patients. The spatial lagged hospital characteristics, WH𝑡𝑡, 
include indicators of for-profit, not-for-profit, and teaching hospitals; number of beds; and 
number of nurses per bed. γ2 represents the spillover effects of neighboring hospitals’ 
characteristics.  
The characteristics of potential patients are controlled by county demographic variables, 
which are from the American Community Survey of the U.S. Census Bureau. This data set 
includes only counties with a population of 65,000 and above in 2005 and 2006. Therefore, 
hospitals in our data are located in relatively more urbanized areas. We control for percentages of 
never married individuals age 15 and above, high school dropouts, high school graduates, male, 
Hispanic, black, and elderly (age 65 and above); median earnings; and population density per 
square mile. One may argue the disparity of health care quality is due to geographic 
heterogeneity. Patients receive better treatment because they are located in an area with better 
9 Teaching hospitals include hospitals with Council of Teaching Hospitals designation, hospitals approved to 
participate in residency and/or internship training by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, and 
those with medical school affiliation reported to the American Medical Association. 
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medical care resources. These county demographic variables are good proxies for geographical 
heterogeneity.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our data. The treatment rates of the four heart 
attack treatment categories have large means and small minimum values. This suggests that the 
distributions of treatment rates are skewed. Out of 2342 hospitals in our sample, 18.5% are for-
profit, 68.7% are non-profit hospitals. The proportion of non-profit hospitals is slightly higher 
than the national average but closer to that in the non-rural areas (Horwitz and Nichols, 2007). 
Of these hospitals, 41.2% have teaching status and 89.4% are located in MSAs. The average 
number of beds is 263 and the average number of nurses per bed is 1.1. The average (median 
earnings) is $33,790 and the average population density is 2,230 individuals per square mile. 
Among the potential patients, 30.9% are never-married, 44% have at most a high school degree, 
12.5% are elderly, 14.5% are Hispanic and 12.5% are black.  
4.  Empirical Results  
We estimate our spatial Durbin panel data model using the generalized moments (GM) 
estimator10 with random effects.  See LeSage and Pace (2009) for a nice introduction of the 
spatial Durbin model and Kapoor, Kelejian and Prucha (2007) for details on the GM 
methodology. Also, Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2010) for an extension of the GM methodology to the 
spatial lag model and Debarsy (2012) for the spatial Durbin model. See also Elhorst (2003) for 
maximum likelihood estimation of spatial lag panel models, and Lee and Yu (2010) and Baltagi 
(2011) for recent surveys of spatial panels.  
10 We use the full set of moment conditions, see Millo and Piras (2012) for details. We also estimate the model using 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) using XSMLE: Stata module for spatial panel data model estimation, see 
Belotti, Hughes, and Mortari (2013). The MLE results were similar to those using the GM estimator except for 
smaller estimates of lambda. However, all the lambda estimates were statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level. These results are available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 2 presents the spillover effects of the heart attack treatment rates using a GM 
estimator. Some of the diagnostics performed include testing the joint significance of the state 
dummies as well as the time dummies. These were jointly significant for all models considered. 
Similarly, the hospital random effects are significant for all models. The first two columns show 
the GM estimation of the overall heart attack treatment rate. Without controlling for the market 
structure in the first column, we find that not-for-profit hospitals provide similar health care to 
heart attack patients as government hospitals. Surprisingly, the treatments in for-profit hospitals 
are significantly worse than not-for-profit and government hospitals. The number of beds, the 
number of nurses per bed, and being a teaching hospital are all positively associated with 
hospital quality. These are in line with the studies of Keeler et al. (1992) and Geweke, 
Gowrisankaran, and Town (2003). Yuan et al. (2000) also find that teaching not-for profit 
hospitals have lower mortality rates and infer that they provide over-all better quality of care. 
Aiken et al. (2002) report that a higher patient-per-nurse ratio increases the mortality rate of AMI. 
A hospital located in a less concentrated market lowers its treatment rates and offers better 
treatments if it generally has higher CMI, i.e., higher average cost per patient. We find little 
evidence that demographic variables affect hospital treatments. Hospitals provide lower quality 
in an area with more Hispanics and blacks, given everything else held constant.  
The estimate of lambda indicates the magnitude of spillover effects among hospitals. For 
the overall treatment rate in column (1), the spatial correlation coefficient estimate is 0.263 
without the measures of market structure. This suggests that when the average heart attack 
treatment rate of neighboring hospitals increases by 1%, the hospital’s treatment rate also 
increases by 0.263%. This effect is not trivial but smaller than the results found by Mobley et al. 
(2006). 
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After adding the market structure variables in column (2), the estimation results are similar 
to those in column (1). However, the effect of blacks is no longer significant. The lambda 
estimate increases to 0.381. Ownership of neighboring hospitals does not impact its own quality. 
Hospitals provide fewer treatments in a market with teaching hospitals and larger neighboring 
hospitals. The significance of market structure variables suggest that ignoring these may generate 
biased results. In addition, these results suggest that the treatment decisions of hospitals may be 
associated with a higher quality of neighbors rather than the distribution of hospital ownership in 
the market. Larger hospitals provide more health care, but when a hospital is close to larger 
hospitals, its treatment rates are lower. Columns (3) to (8) decompose the overall treatment into 
more specific heart attack treatments. Focusing on the estimation with market structure variables, 
we find evidence that for-profit hospitals provide fewer medications to patients after they arrive 
and before they are discharged than government hospitals. Not-for-profit hospitals have a higher 
PCI treatment rate than government hospitals. We find that number of beds, number of nurses 
per bed, and teaching status are positively associated with the medication treatment rates at both 
arrival and discharge, but not with PCI. The number of nurses per bed has relatively strong 
effects, but the number of beds is not significant. On the other hand, the number of nurses has 
little effect on medication at discharge. Teaching hospitals are more likely to give medications to 
heart attack patients. This is in line with the suggestion of Sloan (2000) that major teaching 
hospitals have better quality and non-teaching government hospitals have the worst outcome for 
elderly patients. What is interesting is that teaching status is negatively associated with the PCI 
treatment rate. This could be because teaching hospitals have longer waiting time to perform PCI 
than other hospitals (Nallamothu et al, 2005).  
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A hospital located in a less concentrated market gives fewer medication to heart attack 
patients at arrivals and it offers more of all the heart attack treatments if it generally has larger 
CMI. Hospitals provide fewer PCI treatments in areas with high never-married population and 
high school graduates. 
The lambda estimates range from 0.233 to 0.464. Focusing on estimation with market 
structure, a 1% increase in average treatment rate of each category in neighboring hospitals is 
associated with an increase of 0.31%, 0.41%, and 0.46%, respectively, in the hospital’s own 
treatment rate. The spillover effect of PCI is relatively larger than other treatments. The strong 
and positive spatial correlation of PCI confirms the results of Chandra and Staiger (2007). 
Hospitals are more likely to perform these treatments in a market with a high propensity of 
intensive treatments. 
Except for the number of beds, market structure has different impacts on each treatment 
category. With not-for-profit hospitals in the market, a hospital is more likely to prescribe 
medications at discharge but less likely to perform PCI. All the treatments decrease when there 
are larger hospitals nearby. Interestingly, a hospital prescribes fewer medications at discharge 
when there are teaching hospitals in its neighborhood. 
5. Spillover Effects on Other Illness Conditions 
Hospital Compare also includes four processes of heart failure and six processes of 
pneumonia11. These two illness conditions are less acute in the sense that patients have more 
11 The processes of heart failure include an evaluation of the left ventricular systolic function, ACE inhibitor, 
discharge instructions, and smoking cessation advice during a hospital stay. The processes of pneumonia include 
giving initial antibiotic within 4 hours of arrival, screening for pneumococcal vaccination status, giving oxygenation, 
performing blood culture prior to the first hospital dose of antibiotics, giving smoking cessation advice, and giving 
appropriate initial antibiotics to immune-competent patients with pneumonia during the first 24 hours after arrival. 
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likelihood to travel further for treatments, or for preferred physicians, or for insurance reasons. 
Hence, we expect the effects of competition among hospitals and the geographic heterogeneity to 
be stronger. We combine these treatments for each illness condition and apply the previous 
spatial panel Durbin model to the average treatment rates of heart failure and pneumonia.  
The GM estimation results are presented in Table 3. The first two columns are the 
estimation of heart failure treatments and the latter two columns are for pneumonia treatments. 
Focusing on the estimation with market structure, the results in column (2) suggest that not-for-
profit hospitals provide more treatments than government hospitals.  When the average severity 
of patients (CMI) in the hospitals is high, hospitals provide better treatments to heart failure 
patients. The lambda estimate indicates that when neighboring hospitals increase their heart 
failure treatment rate by 1% on average, it increases its own hospital treatment rate by around 
0.553%. Similar to heart attack treatments, larger hospitals in the neighborhood decrease the 
treatment rates of own hospital. The severity level of patients (CMI) in the neighboring hospitals 
lowers the heart failure treatment rates in own hospitals.  
Column (4) suggests that both for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals provide more 
pneumonia treatments than government hospitals. Teaching hospitals, however, are less likely to 
provide these pneumonia treatments. Hospitals also provide fewer treatments to areas with high 
minority populations. The lambda estimate indicates that when neighboring hospitals increase 
their pneumonia treatment rates by 1% on average, it increases its own hospital treatment rate by 
around 0.54%. Hospitals have lower treatment rates when they have for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals in their neighborhoods.  
6. Discussion 
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Our results suggest that not-for-profit hospitals provide better quality, especially for 
cardiac treatments. One of the possible explanations is that for-profit hospitals are more 
aggressive on cost control. Eggleston and Shen (2011) find that the mortality rate for elderly 
heart attack patients is higher in for-profit hospitals, because they have more restrictive budget 
constraints. McKay and Deily (2008) also suggest that reductions in costs are associated with 
adverse consequences on health outcomes. In addition, not-for-profit hospitals enjoy tax 
exemptions. They are able to transfer the profit to services that are beneficial to patients. If the 
not-for-profit hospitals provide better services due to tax exemption, charitable obligations may 
benefit heart attack patients.  
We find a tendency for some hospitals to favor high technologies or use intense treatments 
rather than less intense treatments as suggested in Skinner and Staiger (2009) and Chandra and 
Staiger (2007). Teaching hospitals provide more medication but less PCI. However, we are not 
able to draw a fine line based on ownership. For-profit hospitals are less likely to provide 
medication while not-for-profits favor PCI. In addition, the effect of ownership depends upon 
treatments and market structure. The results on PCI treatments suggest that not-for-profit 
hospitals provide better intense heart attack treatments in an inter-sectoral market. When a 
market has only for-profit or only not-for-profit hospitals, there is no significant effect or the 
effects are traded off. However, when a not-for-profit hospital is located in a high for-profit 
market, the PCI treatment rate is significantly higher. According to the study of Horwitz and 
Nichols (2009), PCI is a relatively profitable service. This result is in line with their study that 
not-for-profits provide more profitable services in a high for-profit market. On the other hand, 
when for-profit hospitals locate in a high not-for-profit market, they improve their quality by 
providing more medication before they discharge the patients. Not-for-profit hospitals provide 
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better heart failure treatment regardless of the ownership composition in the market. Ownership 
of neighboring hospitals offset the high pneumonia treatment rates of for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals. Therefore, our results on hospital ownership are mixed.  
Our results support the competition hypothesis. Hospitals have lower treatment rates when 
they compete with hospitals of better quality. Competition may generate both positive and 
negative externalities at the same time. Also, when a hospital has a larger neighbor, there is a 
higher probability of empty beds which is costly (Gaynor and Anderson, 1995). Hospitals with 
more beds have diseconomy of scale. The cost may increase with increasing beds (Keeler, 
Melnick, and Zwanziger, 1999). Hospitals may offer fewer treatments for financial reasons. 
As expected, we also find that the spillover effect is stronger for less acute illness 
treatments than heart attack treatments. Less acute illnesses allow patients to travel further, 
making the competition among hospitals to increase. Positive externalities from competition and 
knowledge spillover improve medical services in the whole market. As an anonymous referee 
notes: “the type of competition in which hospitals engage is a local form of competition, among 
neighboring hospitals, as opposed to a global form of competition, where all hospital compete 
with each other regardless where they are geographically located and that could be valid for 
other types of disease, such as cancer”.  
We also examine the sensitivity of our results to changing the radius from 30 miles to 25 
and 35 miles. The results are given in Tables 4 and 5. The effects on own hospital characteristics 
remain similar. What is interesting is that the spillover effect and the effects of neighborhood 
characteristics are slightly stronger as we expand the market range, except for PCI treatment. 
When one hospital is considered to be able to affect another hospital at a further distance, the 
market power or knowledge spillover effect increases. One can argue that basic treatments are 
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easy to obtain and learn from sources that are not bounded by geographical distance. However, 
PCI is “tacit knowledge” that is mainly transferred by face-to-face contact or hands-on 
apprenticeship. Tacitness has spatial limitation and the knowledge property regimes are fairly 
local (Breschi and Lissonni, 2001). Expanding the market makes the spillover relatively smaller.  
Our results corroborate similar findings for France by Gobillon and Milcent (2012). These 
authors find that local composition of ownership and demographic variables have limited effects 
on spatial disparity of innovative treatments in France. They also find strong spillover effects and 
suggest that regional unobservable factors account for 20% of spatial disparities.  
  Since the overall effect depends upon the characteristics of the hospital itself, spillovers 
and market structure, this may explain why Gaynor (2006) suggests a mixed result for the effect 
of competition on hospital quality. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) also conclude that the 
competition level in the market could be a more important determinant of performance than type 
of ownership.  
7. Conclusion  
Our study employs a spatial Durbin panel data model to control for geographic correlation 
of treatments among hospitals. Our results suggest strong and positive spillover effects among 
hospitals. Our results should be tempered by the fact that we included basic treatments which 
were limited by data availability. Some hospitals may perform other effective treatments which 
are not available in our data set. In addition we only focused on three illness conditions. Some 
hospitals may provide better quality care treatments for other illness conditions not reported in 
our data set. 
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Our results on hospital ownership are mixed. While we find some evidence that hospitals 
have different operation strategies by ownership, this also depends on the market structure where 
the hospital is located. One thing that policy makers should not ignore is the effect of spillovers 
which we found to be strong and significant.  
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Figure 1. Geographic Distribution of the Summary Hospital Compare Quality Score in Hospital Referral Regions  
Figure 1a. Overall 
 
Figure 1b. Heart Attack 
 
Figure 1c. Heart Failure 
 
Figure 1d. Pneumonia 
 
 Source: The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care (The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice).
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables: 
  Heart Attack Treatments: 
  Overall 0.921 0.065 0.257 1 
Medication at arrival 0.934 0.063 0.28 1 
Medication at discharge 0.917 0.086 0 1 
PCI 0.627 0.197 0 1 
     Heart Failure Overall Treatments: 0.797 0.129 0.05 1 
Pneumonia Overall Treatments: 0.835 0.082 0.447 1 
     Independent Variables: 
  For-profit 0.185 0.389 0 1 
Not-for-profit 0.687 0.464 0 1 
Number of beds (in 100's) 2.632 2.103 0.04 22.07 
Nurses per bed 1.102 0.522 0.2 7.04 
Teaching Status 0.412 0.49 0 1 
Located in an MSA 0.894 0.308 0 1 
HHI 0.137 0.172 0.001 0.971 
CMI 1.456 0.262 0.642 4.992 
% never married 0.309 0.06 0.166 0.557 
% HS dropouts 0.151 0.059 0.018 0.418 
% HS grads 0.29 0.067 0.116 0.55 
Median earnings (in 10,000's) 3.379 0.061 1.741 6.09 
% male 0.49 0.011 0.445 0.58 
% Hispanic 0.145 0.159 0 0.951 
%  black 0.126 0.129 0 0.668 
%  elderly 0.125 0.033 0.046 0.335 
Population density  (in 10,000's) 0.223 0.668 0.001 0.716 
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Table 2. Estimates of Spillover Effects and Hospital Characteristics on Heart Attack Treatments 
Treatment Overall   
Medicatio
n at arrival   
Medicatio
n at 
discharge   PCI   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         For-profit -0.008** -0.008** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012** -0.012** 0.011 0.015 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.019) 
Not-for-profit 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.057*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) 
Number of beds 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Nurses per bed 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004* 0.004 0.035*** 0.033*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
Teaching Status 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.015*** -0.024** -0.024** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) 
Located  in an 
MSA 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.026 0.025 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.033) (0.034) 
HHI -0.017* -0.016* -0.021** -0.020** -0.021* -0.018 -0.011 -0.009 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.050) (0.050) 
CMI 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.040** 0.045** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.020) 
% never married 0.043 0.047* 0.034 0.036 0.053 0.056 -0.323** -0.296* 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.038) (0.153) (0.154) 
% HS dropouts -0.046 -0.039 -0.039 -0.037 -0.067 -0.047 -0.057 -0.100 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.042) (0.043) (0.174) (0.176) 
% HS grads -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.009 -0.029 -0.035 -0.259* -0.230* 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.132) (0.133) 
Median earnings 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.010 -0.009 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.018) 
% male 0.040 -0.000 0.119 0.091 0.056 -0.017 0.594 0.647 
 
(0.109) (0.110) (0.108) (0.109) (0.148) (0.150) (0.636) (0.640) 
% Hispanic -0.023* -0.009 -0.009 0.001 -0.037** -0.015 -0.078 -0.066 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.074) (0.076) 
% black -0.033** -0.023 -0.020 -0.012 -0.037* -0.024 -0.144* -0.117 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.081) (0.082) 
% elderly 0.030 0.040 0.037 0.045 0.071 0.084 -0.045 -0.105 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.067) (0.068) (0.270) (0.273) 
Population density -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005* -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) 
Spatial (λ) 0.263*** 0.381*** 0.233*** 0.309*** 0.246*** 0.414*** 0.373*** 0.464*** 
 
(0.060) (0.076) (0.064) (0.082) (0.061) (0.081) (0.089) (0.085) 
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Market Structure: 
        For-profit 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.008 
 
0.000 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.028) 
Not-for-profit 
 
0.010 
 
0.009 
 
0.017** 
 
-0.058** 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.024) 
Number of beds 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.007** 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
Nurses per bed 
 
0.001 
 
0.004 
 
0.002 
 
-0.023 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.016) 
Teaching Status 
 
-0.006* 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.011** 
 
0.023 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.015) 
CMI 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.014 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.028) 
         State fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
         F-test for state 
fixed effects 4.34*** 3.49*** 4.37*** 3.63*** 4.42*** 3.27*** 3.39*** 3.38*** 
F-test for year 
fixed effects 88.06*** 87.16*** 63.6*** 62.71*** 77.96*** 77.33*** 21.24*** 21.4*** 
         Number of 
hospitals 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 935 935 
Observations 8,224 8,224 8,224 8,224 8,224 8,224 3,740 3,740 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. Estimates of Spillover Effects and Hospital Characteristics on Heart Failure and Pneumonia 
Treatments 
Treatment Heart Failure 
 
Pneumonia 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     For-profit -0.006 -0.005 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Not-for-profit 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of beds 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nurses per bed 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Teaching Status -0.002 0.001 -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Located in an MSA -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
HHI -0.029* -0.028 -0.008 -0.010 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) 
CMI 0.061*** 0.063*** -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
% never married -0.078 -0.064 -0.007 -0.003 
 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.028) (0.028) 
% HS dropouts -0.020 -0.032 0.005 0.001 
 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.029) (0.029) 
% HS grads 0.046 0.023 0.019 0.017 
 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.024) (0.024) 
Median earnings 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
%  male -0.319 -0.359* -0.031 -0.043 
 
(0.206) (0.209) (0.106) (0.106) 
%  Hispanic 0.013 0.022 -0.022* -0.026** 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) 
% black -0.014 -0.001 -0.025* -0.028* 
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.015) (0.015) 
% elderly 0.020 0.020 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.098) (0.099) (0.050) (0.051) 
Population density 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.050) (0.002) 
     Spatial (λ) 0.482*** 0.553*** 0.608*** 0.540*** 
 
(0.067) (0.070) (0.068) (0.065) 
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Market Structure: 
    For-profit 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.018** 
  
(0.014) 
 
(0.007) 
Not-for-profit 
 
0.000 
 
-0.016*** 
  
(0.012) 
 
(0.006) 
Number of beds 
 
-0.004* 
 
-0.001 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
Nurses per bed 
 
-0.002 
 
0.001 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.004) 
Teaching Status 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.005 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.004) 
CMI 
 
-0.033** 
 
-0.006 
  
(0.026) 
 
(0.008) 
     State fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     F-test statistic for state 
fixed effects 5.27*** 4.84*** 8.70*** 7.99*** 
F-test statistic for year 
fixed effects 241.1*** 240.7*** 621.33*** 623.75*** 
     Number of hospitals 2,130 2,130 2,065 2,065 
Observations 8,520 8,520 8,260 8,260 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 4. Estimates of Spillover Effects and Hospital Characteristics with a 25-mile market radius 
  Heart Attack    Heart Failure Pneumonia 
Treatment Overall 
Medication at 
arrival 
Medication at 
discharge PCI   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     
  
For-profit -0.009** -0.012*** -0.012** 0.011 -0.006 0.010** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.019) (0.007) (0.004) 
Not-for-profit 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 0.055*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.006) (0.003) 
Number of beds 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nurses per bed 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.034*** 0.010** 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) 
Teaching Status 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.014*** -0.023** -0.002 -0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) 
Located  in an MSA 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.018 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.040) (0.009) (0.005) 
HHI -0.012 -0.017** -0.010 -0.015 -0.034** -0.013 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.048) (0.017) (0.009) 
CMI 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.065*** 0.045** 0.061*** -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.020) (0.008) (0.004) 
% never married 0.044 0.034 0.056 -0.338** -0.086 -0.007 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.039) (0.160) (0.057) (0.029) 
% HS dropouts -0.042 -0.037 -0.047 -0.176 -0.032 0.009 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.044) (0.182) (0.060) (0.030) 
% HS grads 0.004 -0.002 -0.015 -0.227 0.030 0.016 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.139) (0.050) (0.025) 
Median earnings 0.005 0.005* 0.005 -0.013 0.002 0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.018) (0.006) (0.003) 
% male 0.058 0.156 0.033 0.713 -0.351* -0.039 
 
(0.112) (0.111) (0.154) (0.666) (0.211) (0.108) 
% Hispanic -0.010 -0.001 -0.012 -0.046 0.015 -0.030** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.077) (0.025) (0.013) 
% black -0.020 -0.010 -0.020 -0.097 -0.001 -0.029* 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.084) (0.029) (0.015) 
% elderly 0.046 0.046 0.096 -0.071 0.015 -0.002 
 
(0.052) (0.050) (0.069) (0.285) (0.100) (0.052) 
Population density -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) 
Spatial (λ) 0.324*** 0.215*** 0.403*** 0.480*** 0.509*** 0.495*** 
 
(0.077) (0.083) (0.081) (0.086) (0.068) (0.065) 
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Market Structure: 
    
  
For-profit 0.007 0.006 0.013 -0.017 -0.007 -0.015** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.028) (0.013) (0.007) 
Not-for-profit 0.015** 0.014** 0.022*** -0.077*** -0.002 -0.015** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.024) (0.011) (0.006) 
Number of beds -0.003*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.006* -0.004* -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Nurses per bed 0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.030* -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.003) 
Teaching Status -0.003 0.001 -0.006 0.026* -0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.007) (0.004) 
CMI -0.002 -0.003 -0.009 -0.014 -0.021 0.001 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.028) (0.014) (0.007) 
     
  
State fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
  
Number of hospitals 2,016 2,016 2,016 908 2,092 2,029 
Observations 8,064 8,064 8,064 3,632 8,368 8,116 
       
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%. 
 
34 
 
Table 5. Estimates of Spillover Effects and Hospital Characteristics with a 35-mile market radius 
  Heart Attack   Heart Failure Pneumonia 
Treatment Overall 
Medication at 
arrival 
Medication at 
discharge PCI   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     
  
For-profit -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.017 -0.003 0.011*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.007) (0.004) 
Not-for-profit 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.056*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.006) (0.003) 
Number of beds 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nurses per bed 0.004** 0.002 0.003 0.034*** 0.007* -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) 
Teaching Status 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014*** -0.018* -0.000 -0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) 
Located  in an MSA 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.018 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.029) (0.009) (0.005) 
HHI -0.016 -0.022** -0.011 0.011 -0.024 -0.009 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.049) (0.019) (0.010) 
CMI 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.073*** 0.025 0.068*** -0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.008) (0.004) 
% never married 0.043 0.030 0.049 -0.305** -0.076 -0.024 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.039) (0.142) (0.055) (0.028) 
% HS dropouts -0.037 -0.041 -0.033 -0.124 -0.019 -0.012 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.043) (0.169) (0.058) (0.030) 
% HS grads 0.008 0.009 -0.023 -0.210 -0.010 0.010 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.128) (0.049) (0.025) 
Median earnings 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.009 0.001 0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.017) (0.006) (0.003) 
% male -0.034 0.035 -0.042 0.567 -0.291 -0.077 
 
(0.112) (0.115) (0.151) (0.607) (0.205) (0.104) 
% Hispanic -0.014 -0.006 -0.016 -0.077 0.020 -0.021 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.072) (0.025) (0.013) 
% black -0.021 -0.013 -0.021 -0.130* -0.004 -0.029* 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.076) (0.028) (0.015) 
% elderly 0.021 0.022 0.061 -0.185 -0.003 0.002 
 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.069) (0.257) (0.099) (0.053) 
Population density -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) 
Spatial (λ) 0.449*** 0.346*** 0.527*** 0.375*** 0.650*** 0.587*** 
 
(0.079) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.073) (0.064) 
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Market Structure: 
    
  
For-profit 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.002 -0.012 -0.020*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.028) (0.014) (0.007) 
Not-for-profit 0.014** 0.015** 0.020** -0.057** -0.001 -0.013** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.024) (0.012) (0.006) 
Number of beds -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.007** -0.004* -0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Nurses per bed 0.002 0.006 0.001 -0.023 -0.003 0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.004) 
Teaching Status -0.007* -0.002 -0.011** 0.010 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.008) (0.004) 
CMI -0.016* -0.016* -0.027** 0.002 -0.038** -0.006 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.003) (0.015) (0.008) 
     
  
State fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
  
Number of hospitals 2,110 2,110 2,110 993 2,158 2,153 
Observations 8,440 8,440 8,440 3,972 8,632 8,612 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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